

NEW ISSUE REPORT

FONCAIXA PYMES 4, FTA

ABS/SME Loans/Spain

Closing Date

21 November 2013

Table of Contents

DEFINITIVE RATINGS	1
ASSET SUMMARY	1
ASSET SUMMARY (CONTINUED)	2
LIABILITIES, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND LIQUIDITY	2
COUNTERPARTIES	2
MOODY'S VIEW	3
COMPOSITE V SCORE	4
STRENGTHS AND CONCERNS	5
STRUCTURE, LEGAL ASPECTS AND ASSOCIATED RISKS	6
ORIGINATOR PROFILE, SERVICER PROFILE AND OPERATING RISKS	8
COLLATERAL DESCRIPTION	9
CREDIT ANALYSIS	10
BENCHMARK ANALYSIS	12
PARAMETER SENSITIVITIES	15
MONITORING	15
MOODY'S RELATED RESEARCH	16
APPENDIX 1: ORIGINATOR'S UNDERWRITING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES	17

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Definitive Ratings

Series	Rating	Amount (million)	% of Notes	Legal Final Maturity	Coupon	Subordination	Reserve Fund	Total Credit Enhancement*
A	A3(sf)	516	80%	Sep-46	3-month EURIBOR +1.25%	20%	10%	30%
B	B1(sf)	129	20%	Sep-46	3-month EURIBOR +1.50%	0%	10%	10%
Total		645						

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion the structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal at par, on or before the rated final legal maturity date. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

* No benefit attributed to excess spread.

V score for the sector: Medium/High

V score for the subject transaction: Medium/High

FONCAIXA PYMES 4 is a cash securitisation of a static portfolio comprising loans and drawn amounts under lines of credit extended to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The portfolio is a mix of secured and unsecured credit assets.

Asset Summary (as of 28 October 2013)

Sellers/Originators:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Servicer(s):	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Receivables:	Loans and drawdowns under lines of credit to SMEs and self-employed individuals in Spain
Methodology Used:	>> Moody's Approach to Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisation, May 2013 (SF294868)
Model Used:	CDOROM & ABSROM
Total Amount:	€645 million
Length of Revolving Period:	Static
Number of Assets:	11,423
Number of Borrowers:	10,625 (including groups)

Asset Summary (Continued)

Effective Number:	347 (including groups)
Weighted-Average (WA) Remaining Term:	7.1 years
WA Seasoning:	2.9 years
WA Life (WAL) in Years:	4.2 years*
WA Interest Rate:	3.6%
WA Current LTV :	33.6%**
Delinquency Status:	2.4% of the provisional portfolio was in arrears up to 29 days

* Based on amortisation profile provided for provisional pool as of 28 October 2013; calculation assumes 0% CPR

** LTV calculation takes into account claims ranking senior on the property backing the securitised mortgages (without taking into account senior liens WA LTV is 19.1%)

Liabilities, Credit Enhancement and Liquidity

Excess Spread Range:	No guaranteed excess spread as transaction is unhedged. At closing the difference between WA interest on the pool and WA interest on the notes is approximately 2.1% p.a.
Credit Enhancement/Reserves:	Excess spread as defined above 10% reserve fund Subordination of the notes
Form of Liquidity:	Cash reserve and principal to pay interest
Number of Interest Payments Covered by Liquidity:	At closing the cash reserve covers almost 2 years of interest on Series A and Series B notes, plus senior fees, even considering a three-month EURIBOR of 4% and 0.5% of stressed senior fees.
Percentage of Reserve Fund Dedicated to Liquidity:	Cash reserve does not have a liquidity ledger.
Interest Payments:	Quarterly in arrears on each payment date
Principal Payments:	Pass-through on each payment date after the lock-up period.
Payment Dates:	Each 18 March, June, September, December First payment date: 18 March 2013
Hedging Arrangements:	None

Counterparties

Issuer:	FONCAIXA PYMES 4, FTA
Sellers/Originators:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Servicer:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Back-up Servicer:	None
Back-up Servicer Facilitator:	None
Cash Manager:	GestiCaixa S.G.F.T; S.A
Back-up Cash Manager:	None
Interest Rate Swap Counterparty:	N/A
F/X Swap Counterparty:	N/A
Basis Counterparty:	N/A
Issuer Account Bank:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Collection Account Bank:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Paying Agent:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Note Trustee (Management Company):	GestiCaixa S.G.F.T; S.A (NR)
Issuer Administrator:	GestiCaixa S.G.F.T; S.A (NR)
Arranger:	GestiCaixa S.G.F.T; S.A (NR)
Lead Managers:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Other Parties:	Cuatrecasas

Moody's View

Outlook for the Sector:	Negative
Unique Feature:	Asset type and structure previously seen in the market.
Degree of Linkage to Originator:	Caixabank will act as servicer, issuer account bank and paying agent.
Originator's Securitisation History:	
Number of Precedent Transactions in Sector:	13 SME transactions as single originator, as well as strong experience in securitisation of other assets.
Percentage of Book Securitised:	N/A
Behaviour of Precedent Transactions:	The performance of previous SME deals originated by Caixabank is better than the market average.
Key Differences between Subject and Precedent Transactions:	N/A
Portfolio Relative Performance:	
Default Rate Assumed/Ranking:	12.4% . Comparison can be found in Benchmark Analysis section.
Coefficient of Variation Assumed on Default Rate/Ranking:	71.7%. Comparison can be found in Benchmark Analysis section.
Recovery Rate Assumed/Ranking:	50%. Comparison can be found in Benchmark Analysis section.
Delinquencies Observed in Portfolio:	Lower than peer group.
Potential Rating Sensitivity:	
Chart Interpretation:	We also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the rated notes. For instance, if the assumed default probability of 12.4% used in determining the initial rating was changed to 16.1% and the recovery rate of 50% was changed to 40%, the model-indicated rating for Series A and Series B of A3(sf) and B1(sf) would change to Baa3(sf) and Caa1(sf) respectively..
Factors Which Could Lead to a Downgrade:	In addition to the counterparty linkage, the following factors may have a significant impact on the subject transaction's ratings: further deterioration in the real estate market (beyond the recovery lag and stress that was modelled) and regulatory changes either at national or regional level.

TABLE 1

	Portfolio WA PD Assumption	Recovery Rate		
		50.0%	45.0%	40.0%
Series A	12.4%	A3(sf)* (0)	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa1(sf) (1)
	14.3%	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa2(sf) (2)
	16.1%	Baa2(sf) (2)	Baa2(sf) (2)	Baa3(sf) (3)
Series B	12.4%	B1(sf)* (0)	B1(sf) (0)	B2(sf) (1)
	14.3%	B2(sf) (1)	B2(sf) (1)	B3(sf) (2)
	16.1%	B3(sf) (2)	B3(sf) (2)	Caa1(sf) (3)

- Results are model-indicated ratings, which are one of the many inputs considered by rating committees, which take quantitative and qualitative factors into account in determining actual ratings. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
- Results under base case assumptions indicated by '*'. Change in model-indicated rating (number of notches) is noted in parentheses.
- Moody's estimates a cumulative mean DP for the portfolio and the corresponding proxy rating applying its SME methodology. Please refer to Moody's Approach to Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations, published in May 2013.

Composite V Score

Breakdown Of The V Scores Assigned To		Sector	Transaction	Remarks
Composite Score: Low, Medium or High		M/H	M/H	
1	Sector Historical Data Adequacy and Performance Variability	M/H	M/H	
1.1	Quality of Historical Data for the Sector	M/H	M/H	
1.2	Sector's Historical Performance Variability	M/H	M/H	
1.3	Sector's Historical Downgrade Rate	M/H	M/H	
2	Issuer/Sponsor/Originator Historical Data Adequacy, Performance Variability and Quality of Disclosure	M/H	M/H	
2.1	Quality of Historical Data for the Issuer/Sponsor/ Originator	M/H	M/H	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Same as sector score. » Internal ratings and scoring with the corresponding probability of default (PD) info has been provided on a line by line basis. Additionally, cumulative historical information on delinquencies and recoveries has been made available.
2.2	Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's Historical Performance Variability	M/H	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank has one of the lowest default rates among Spanish originators.
2.3	Disclosure of Securitization Collateral Pool Characteristics	L/M	L	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Detailed loan-by-loan data on an extensive list of fields has been provided for the analysis of the transaction, including data on refinanced loans. » Information on the internal rating system (certified by the Bank of Spain) of Caixabank has been provided line by line: scoring, PDs, risk segments. » Cumulative historical information on delinquencies and recoveries was provided on the obligor type (self employed individuals) and product type (loans and lines of credits) which are included in the securitised pool.
2.4	Disclosure of Securitization Performance	M	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Same as sector score. » Moody's has not received a specific template for the monitoring report. Expectations are that the management company Gesticaixa will continue providing at least the same amount and quality of data as it is currently doing for previous deals.
3	Complexity and Market Value Sensitivity	M	M	» Same as sector score.
3.1	Transaction Complexity	M	M	» Same as sector score.
3.2	Analytic Complexity	M	M	» Same as sector score.
3.3	Market Value Sensitivity	M	M	» Same as sector score.
4	Governance	L/M	L/M	» Same as sector score.
4.1	Experience of, Arrangements Among and Oversight of Transaction Parties	L/M	L/M	» Same as sector score.
4.2	Back-up Servicer Arrangement	L	L	» Same as sector score: in its role of gestora, Gesticaixa would act as BUS should Caixabank default
4.3	Alignment of Interests	L/M	L/M	» Same as sector score.
4.4	Legal, Regulatory, or Other Uncertainty	L/M	L/M	» Same as sector score.

Strengths and Concerns

Strengths:

- » **Performance of Previous Caixabank Deals:** Previous SME deals originated by Caixabank show a strong performance, with a portfolio delinquency level of 2.75% (loans between 90-360 days in arrears over current outstanding balance). Cumulative defaults and 90+ day delinquency levels are among the lowest in the Spanish SME market.
- » **No Refinanced or Restructured Loans:** The securitised portfolio excludes refinanced and restructured loans, which have a higher probability of default.
- » **Low Exposure to Real Estate:** According to industry information provided by Caixabank, 16.4% of the portfolio as of closing is exposed to the Construction and Building sector (includes 0.3% loans to real estate developers), which is low by Spanish market standards. These exposures have been addressed by Moody's quantitative analysis as further explained in Credit Analysis.
- » **Diversified Pool:** Compared with other transactions from this originator, the debtors are located all over Spain. The largest regions are Catalonia and Comunidad de Madrid, with a weight of 32% and 13.8%, respectively. In terms of industry concentration, the two top sectors in the pool are Beverage, Food & Tobacco and Hotel, Gaming & Leisure, which represent each 21.7% and 16.7% in volume terms, respectively.
- » **Low LTV on Mortgages:** The proportion of assets secured by real estate properties is 33.1% of the portfolio volume, the majority of them comprising second lien mortgages. However the WA LTV of these mortgages is low at 33.6% (without taking into account senior liens WA LTV is 19.1%) which supports relatively high expected recoveries.

Concerns and Mitigants:


Moody's committees particularly focused on the following factors, listed in order of those most likely to affect the ratings:

- » **Flexible Products:** 6.7% of the portfolio corresponds to a flexible product structured as a line of credit. In those lines of credit secured on real estate (*Crédito Hipotecario*), which comprise 5.1% of the portfolio volume, the possibility of further drawdowns creates uncertainty in the underlying LTV. This feature has been taken into account in Moody's quantitative analysis as more fully explained in Treatment of Concerns.
- » **Holiday Payments and Principal Grace Periods:** The portfolio has an exposure of 7.7% in volume terms to contracts under a principal grace period. As described in the section Credit Analysis, the probability of default assumptions were adjusted for loans with these features. Additionally, the pool is exposed to products where obligors may request payment holidays or interest and principal grace periods in the future. However, the exposure to these is only 0.6% of the pool volume. Moreover, granting this flexibility is subject certain conditions, and to final approval from Caixabank.
- » **Bullet Maturities:** The portfolio volume comprises around 14.6% of bullet amortising contracts. As described in the section Credit Analysis, the probability of default assumptions were adjusted for loans with these features.
- » **Interest rate risk:** At closing, 80.3% of the pool balance consist of floating rate loans and 19.7% fixed rate loans, whereas the notes are floating liabilities. The structure is exposed to interest rate and basis risk as these are not hedged. This feature has been taken into account in our analysis as described in the section "Structure, Legal Aspects and Associated Risks".
- » **Commingling Risk:** In the event of insolvency of Caixabank, and until notification is delivered to the relevant debtors to redirect their payments, collections on the underlying assets may be commingled with other funds belonging to Caixabank. The structure does not contemplate any commingling reserve. To reflect this risk, Moody's has assumed in its modelling that a portion of the asset collections may be lost.

Structure, Legal Aspects and Associated Risks

EXHIBIT 1

Structure Chart



Allocation of Payments/Waterfall: On each quarterly payment date, the *fondo's* available funds (i.e., amounts received from the portfolio, the reserve fund, amounts received under the swap agreement, and interest earned on the treasury account) will be applied in the following simplified order of priority:

1. Taxes and issuer's expenses, including the gestora and paying agent fees.
2. Payment of interest on Class A Bonds
3. Redemption of Class A Bonds
4. Payment of interest on Class B Bonds
5. Redemption of Class B Bonds
6. Replenishment of the Reserve Fund to its required level
7. Payment of interest on Subordinated Loan that funded the Reserve Fund
8. Redemption of the Subordinated Loan that funded the Reserve Fund
9. Payment of interest on Subordinated Loan that funded the Funds' initial expenses
10. Redemption of the Subordinated Loan that funded the Funds' initial expenses
11. Other junior amounts

The notes will amortise sequentially.

Allocation of Payments/PDL Mechanism: The transaction's structure benefits from an "artificial write-off" mechanism. This mechanism is implicit in the definition of principal due under the notes, which is calculated as the difference between: (i) the outstanding amount of series A and B notes; and (ii) the outstanding amount of the non-written-off loans in the portfolio. As such, this mechanism allows the structure to capture excess spread (when available) to redeem notes in an amount equal to the "written-off" loans. "Written-off loans" are defined as those loans with any amount due but unpaid for more than 12 months, or those amounts in arrears that the originator considers unlikely to be collected. It is important to highlight that this is standard in the Spanish securitisation market, where the mechanism is usually defined as 12 to 18 months, as seen for other SME transactions.

The "artificial write-off" speeds up the amortisation of defaulted loans. Thus, the amount of notes collateralised by defaulted loans is minimised, and so is, consequently, the negative carry. However, the most significant benefit for the transaction is that the amount of spread trapped in the structure is larger (the excess spread between the "artificial write-off" time and the "natural write-off" time would otherwise be lost). Therefore, the transaction makes better use of the spread, allowing for lower levels of other forms of credit enhancement.

Performance Triggers:

Trigger	Conditions	Consequence
Termination of Reserve Fund Amortisation	The arrears level exceeds 1.0%. The reserve fund is not funded at its required level on the previous payment date. Less than three years have elapsed since closing.	The target amount of the reserve fund will not be reduced on any payment date on which these occur.

Reserve Fund: The reserve fund has been funded up front with a subordinated loan granted by the originator for an amount equal to 10% of the notes. It provides both credit and liquidity protection to the notes.

After the first three years of the transaction, the reserve fund may amortise over the remaining life of the transaction so that it amounts to the higher of:

- » 20% of the outstanding balance of the Series A and B notes
- » 5% of the initial balance of the Series A and B notes

It will be used to cover potential shortfalls on interest or principal on an ongoing basis.

Assets:**Asset transfer:**

True Sale: According to the legal opinion received, the sale of credit rights has been carried out in compliance with Spanish securitisation law.

Bankruptcy Remoteness: Under Spanish securitisation law, a Spanish SPV (FTA/FTH) is not subject to the Spanish Insolvency Act. Only the management company, acting in the best interest of the noteholders, can decide to liquidate the *fondo*.

Claw-back Risk Upon Default of the Originator: Claw-back risk is limited to those activities performed during a period of two years prior to the declaration of the bankruptcy state, even in the absence of fraud. However, in no case the activities performed under the regular activity of the originator may be cancelled as the transfer of credit rights forms part of the normal activity of Caixabank.

Interest Rate Mismatch: 19.7% of the portfolio corresponds to fixed-rate loans and the remaining 80.3% to floating-rate loans (in most cases linked to 12-month EURIBOR), whereas the notes will be floating liabilities (three-month EURIBOR). As a result, the *fondo* will be subject to base rate mismatch risk on the floating portion of the portfolio (i.e., the risk that the reference rate used to compute the interest amount payable on the notes will differ from the interest rate payable on the underlying SME loans) and fixed-floating risk (i.e., the risk that the reference rate of the notes will differ from the interest rates payable on the fixed-rate portion of the portfolio).

Our analysis of the base rate mismatch takes into account the potential interest rate exposure and is based on the observed historical volatility between the interest rate payable on the notes and the respective interest rates payable by the assets. The resulting adjustment reduces the gross margin on the loans to a range of 50bps.

The fixed-floating risk is quantified by making stressed assumptions on the evolution of the three-month EURIBOR over a period equivalent to the weighted-average remaining term of the fixed-rate sub-pool.

In addition we stress the yield vector of the portfolio taking into account the margin compression due to prepayments and renegotiations.

Cash Commingling: Caixabank collects all of the payments under the loans in its portfolio under a direct debit scheme into its account and transfers them daily to a treasury account held in the name of the SPV. As a result, in the event of insolvency of Caixabank, and until notification is delivered to the relevant debtors to redirect their payments, Caixabank will continue to collect payments by the underlying debtors, which may be commingled with other funds belonging to Caixabank.

The transaction does not contemplate setting up any commingling reserve to compensate for collections potentially lost should Caixabank default.

Mitigant: Payments are transferred daily to the treasury account in the name of the SPV held by Caixabank.

- » Caixabank may notify the debtors of the transfer of the loans in order to perfect the sale. The management company also has the ability to carry out the notification.
- » Triggers are in place to protect the treasury account (by finding a suitably rated guarantor or substitute) from a possible downgrade of the GIC provider's short-term rating. However, the trigger is set at a low level at Ba1.

We have assumed in its cash flow modelling that part of the payments collected may be lost due to this risk.

Set-off: 100% of obligors have accounts with the seller.

Mitigant: Set-off is very limited because only unpaid instalments prior to the declaration of insolvency might be offset against the deposits held by the debtors (considered as fully due and payable prior to the insolvency).

Originator Profile, Servicer Profile and Operating Risks

Date of Operations Review:	November 2013
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Originator Background:

Rating:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Financial Institution Group Outlook for Sector:	Negative
Ownership Structure:	N/A
Asset Size:	N/A
% of Total Book Securitised:	N/A
Transaction as % of Total Book:	N/A
% of Transaction Retained:	100%

Servicer & Back-Up Servicer Background:

Servicer and its Rating:	Caixabank (Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook)
Total Number of Receivables Serviced:	N/A
Number of Staff:	32,347 (5,920 branches) as of September 2013
Servicer Assessment:	
Strength of Back-up Servicer Arrangement:	N/A
Back-up Servicer and its Rating:	N/A
Ownership Structure:	N/A
Regulated By:	N/A
Total Number of Receivables Serviced:	N/A
Number of Staff:	N/A

Originator Related Triggers

Key Servicer Termination Events:	Insolvency; intervention by the Bank of Spain; breach of service's obligation resulting in being substituted as servicer; or at the request of the management company (acting in the best interest of the noteholders)
Downgrade of Original Servicer's Rating to Certain Level	N/A
Appointment of Back-up Servicer Upon:	N/A
Key Cash Manager Termination Events:	Insolvency
Notification of Obligor of True Sale	Insolvency; intervention by the Bank of Spain; breach of service's obligation resulting in being substituted as servicer; or at the request of the management company (acting in the best interest of the noteholders).
Conversion to Daily Sweep	None (sweep is done daily).
Notification of Redirection of Payments to SPV's Account	Insolvency; intervention by the Bank of Spain; breach of service's obligation resulting in being substituted as servicer; or at the request of the management company (acting in the best interest of the noteholders).
Accumulation of Set Off Reserve	N/A
Receivable Administration:	
Method of Payment:	100% by direct debit
% of Obligor with Account at Originator:	100%
Distribution of Payment Dates:	N/A

Cash Manager:

Cash Manager and Its Rating:	GestiCaixa S.G.F.T; S.A (N.R)
Main Responsibilities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Keeping the fund's accounts separate from those of the management company. » Complying with its formal, documentary and reporting duties to the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, the rating agencies and any other supervisory body. » Appointing and, if necessary, replacing and dismissing the auditor who is to review and audit the Fund's annual accounts. » Complying with the calculation duties provided for and taking the actions laid down in the Deed of Constitution and in the Prospectus. » Checking that the mortgage credit income amount actually received by the Fund matches the amounts that must be received by the Fund, on the terms of issue of the pass-through certificates and on the terms of the relevant mortgage credits. » Calculating and determining on each determination date the principal to be amortised and repaid on each bond series on the relevant payment date. » Verifying that the amounts credited to the treasury account return the yield set in the agreement. » Instructing transfers of funds between the various borrowing and lending accounts, and issuing all relevant payment instructions, including those allocated to servicing the bonds. » Calculating the available funds, the available funds for amortisation of the notes, the liquidation available funds and the payment or withholding obligations to be complied with, and applying the same in the priority of payments or, as the case may be, in the liquidation priority of payments. » The management company may extend or amend the agreements entered into on behalf of the Fund, and substitute, as necessary, each of the Fund service providers on the terms provided for in each agreement.
Calculation Timeline:	Determination Date: 3 business days before the payment date.
Back-up Cash Manager and Its Rating:	None
Main Responsibilities of Back-up Cash Manager:	N/A

Collateral Description

EXHIBIT 2

Portfolio Breakdown by Year of Origination




EXHIBIT 3

Portfolio Breakdown by Year of Maturity




EXHIBIT 4

Portfolio Breakdown by Industry Sector





EXHIBIT 5

Portfolio Breakdown by Region



Additional Information on Borrowers:

Top Debtor Concentration:	2.8%
Top 5 Debtors:	9.1%
Top 10 Debtors:	13.1%
Top 25 Debtors:	19.5%
Industry Concentration:	Beverage, Food & Tobacco 21.7%
	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure 16.7%
	Construction & Building 16.4%
Geographic Concentration:	Catalonia 32.0%
	Comunidad de Madrid 13.8%
	Andalusia 11.6%

Additional Information on Portfolio:

Number of Contracts:	11,423
Type of Contracts:	6.7% credit lines and 93.3% standard loans
Contract Amortisation	French: 71.4%
Style:	Constant amortisation: 14.0%
	Bullet : 14.6%
% Large Corporates:	0.00%
% Bullet Loans:	14.6%
% Real Estate Developers:	0.3%
WA Interest Rate:	3.6%
Guarantees:	33.1% of the portfolio volume secured by mortgages (most of them second lien)

Audits: Performed by Deloitte, SL. in compliance with the Spanish regulatory framework.

Lines of Credit: 6.7% of the portfolio comprises drawdown amounts under a product structured as a line of credit, some of these secured by mortgages (*Crédito Hipotecario*) and others unsecured (*Crédito no Hipotecario*).

This product gives the borrower the opportunity to obtain additional financing easily as well as payback flexibility.

Borrowers are allowed to withdraw for an amount equal to the already amortised amount, or up to an established credit limit. The credit lines are typically used for the purpose of acquiring assets and working capital.

Main features:

1. The subsequent redraws rank *pari-passu* with the first draw in case of execution.
2. Each client will receive just one monthly statement, although each different redraw will be stated separately.
3. The first redraw cannot exceed an 70% LTV limit in order to acquire houses. To acquire commercial properties the limit is typically set up at 60% and to acquire other types of assets the limit is 50%.

Additional redraws are typically capped at 60% LTV levels for acquiring houses and 50% for the rest of assets.

4. Caixabank may impose clauses that allow the bank to deny subsequent redraws when they are not feasible (based on the borrower's payment history, etc.).
5. For lines of credit secured on mortgages, the limit for subsequent redraws is reduced progressively during the last four years of the life of the contract. For unsecured lines of credit there is an established date beyond which it is not possible to make subsequent redraws.
6. Lines of credit might have the option of enjoying principal grace periods, either at the beginning or during the life of the credit line. Each borrower has the option to request it for a maximum of 36 months.
7. Additionally, some lines of credit (only those secured on mortgages) might have the option of enjoying interest and principal grace periods (holiday payment). In this case, the borrower could request, for a maximum of 12 months, holiday payments during which neither principal nor interest is paid. Unpaid interest is capitalised at the end of the grace period. A commission is charged to the client when this is requested.

Only 0.6% of the pool volume is exposed to lines of credit (which are not currently enjoying a grace period) where customers could request future holiday payments or future principal grace periods.

Eligibility Criteria:

Some of the key eligibility criteria include the following:


- » All the loans/lines of credits have been originated either by Caixabank or, in the case of transactions prior to the date when Caixabank was created, these were originated by La Caixa.
- » All the loans/lines of credits have been either formalised under public deed or through a private contract. In the case of private contracts Caixabank keeps the respective documents (promissory note or IOU) and undertakes to take any recovery action on behalf of the *fondo* or deliver these documents to the gestora, should it request so.
- » All the loans are euro-denominated and are payable only in euros.
- » All obligors are SMEs (including self employed) as defined under EU recommendation 2003/361
- » All the mortgaged properties are fully developed and located in Spain, and have been appraised through appraisal firms duly registered with Bank of Spain.

- » The pool will not include leasing contracts, syndicated loans and refinanced or restructured loans/lines of credits.
- » The principal of all securitised loans and draws/redraws under lines of credits has been 100% disbursed (notwithstanding there can be other separate drawdowns not included in the portfolio).

Credit Analysis


Precedent Transactions' Performance: The performance of previous transactions originated by Caixabank is better than the average observed in the Spanish market, both in terms of delinquencies and cumulative defaults, compared with other Spanish originators in the SME segment.

EXHIBIT 6
Spanish SME 90-360 Days Delinquency – trend by originator



Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer reports

EXHIBIT 7
Spanish SME Cumulative Defaults – seasoning by originator



Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer reports

Default Definition: The definition of a defaulted asset in this transaction is one which is more than 12 months in arrears.

Assumptions: Note that other values may also result in the same ratings being achieved.

Assumptions

CPR:	5%
Distribution:	Inverse Normal
Default Rate:	12.4%
Stdev/mean:	71.7%
Timing of Default:	Flat over WAL of 4.2 years in the analysed pool
Recoveries:	Mean 50% (stochastic recoveries)
Recovery Lag:	50% (in 2nd year after default) and 50% (in 3rd year)
Correlation Default/Recoveries:	10%
Amortisation Profile:	Actual pool amortization
Fees:	0.50%
Fees Floor:	€100,000
EURIBOR (three-month):	4%
PDL definition:	12 months
Write-off:	12 months

Derivation of Default Rate Assumption: We analysed historical performance data as well as other sources of information (for instance, macroeconomic data, internal ratings data of Caixabank) to determine the default assumption.

We have complemented the historical data analysis with a top-down approach, as detailed below. We split the portfolio into three sub-pools based on the economic sector in which the debtor was active: (i) construction and building; (ii) Real Estate Developer; and (iii) all other industries. Our rating proxies assumed are shown in the table below.

Borrower's Main Sector Of Activity	Rating Proxy
Construction & Building	B1
Other Industries	Ba2

The above assumptions include some adjustments that take into account the current macro-economic environment (generally in the range of one-two notches), as well as the originator's underwriting ability.

We further adjusted the assumptions to account for the size of the companies (one notch down for micro and small enterprises). Finally, we also adjusted the PD assumptions according to the loan characteristics. For bullet loans the PD was increased considering an additional one year exposure to default at the time of refinancing. For loans with current or potential principal grace period or potential holiday payment, an additional 10% PD stress was applied.

Timing of Defaults: We tested several timing of default curves to assess the robustness of the ratings. In the base-

case scenario, the timing of defaults curve assumed is flat over 4.2 years.

Derivation of Recovery Rate Assumption: Assumptions for recoveries were made on the basis of (i) historical recovery information provided by Caixabank; (ii) statistical information on the Spanish SME market; (iii) feedback from our corporate team; and (iv) other quantitative and pool derived aspects. Regarding the last point, we estimated the recovery rate on the secured portion of the portfolio based on the property valuation data, applying conservative haircuts to take into account property price deflation and associated costs to the recovery process. We have taken into consideration the proportion of loans backed by mortgages (33.1% of the total volume, most of them second liens). Caixabank provided data on claims ranking senior on the properties backing the securitised mortgages, thus we were able to give credit to second lien mortgages.

Modelling Approach: Given the number of assets and the size of the exposures in the portfolio (see section entitled "Collateral Description"), Moody's derived the default distribution curve by using the inverse normal density law. To determine such distribution, two main input parameters needed to be assessed: (i) the mean default probability of the portfolio, and (ii) the standard deviation of the default distribution (estimated using CDOROM).


Moody's tested the credit enhancement levels by using its ABSROM cash flow model, which has been adjusted to take into account a number of structural features.

Moody's considered how the cash flow generated by the collateral was allocated to the parties within the transaction, and the extent to which various structural feature of the transaction might provide additional protection to investors, or act as a source of risk. In addition, Moody's analysed the strength of triggers to reduce the exposure of the portfolio to originator or servicer bankruptcy.

To determine the rating assigned to each series of notes, Moody's used an expected loss methodology that reflected the probability of default for each series of notes. With this purpose, and in order to allocate losses to the notes in accordance with their priority of payments and relatively size, Moody's built a cash flow model that reproduces many deal-specific characteristics (the main input parameter of the model is described in the table above). By weighting each default scenario's severity result on the notes with its probability of occurrence, Moody's calculated the expected loss average for each series of the notes as well as the expected average life. Moody's then compared the quantitative values to the Moody's idealised expected loss table to determine the ratings assigned to each series of the notes.

EXHIBIT 8

Defaults Distribution and Loss Sensitivity



The green line in Chart 8 represents each default scenario on the default distribution curve for the loss suffered by the notes (in our modelling). For pool default rate up to 46.8%, the line corresponding to Series A losses is flat at zero, hence the notes are not suffering any loss. The first pool default rate under which Class A notes suffer a loss is 46.8%. The steepness of the curve then indicates the speed of the increase of losses suffered by the notes.

The rating of the notes has therefore been based on an analysis of:

- » The characteristics of the securitised pool
- » The macroeconomic environment
- » Sector-wide and originator specific performance data
- » Protection provided by credit enhancement and liquidity support against defaults and arrears in the pool
- » The legal and structural integrity of the transaction

Treatment of Concerns:

- » **Flexible Products:** The portfolio comprises 6.7% of drawdowns under lines of credit, most of them *Crédito Hipotecario*, i.e. backed by mortgages. This type of product allows multiple drawdowns against the same mortgage so that securitised drawdowns would have a claim on the property that would be *pari-passu* with those drawdowns not included in the portfolio. At the same time, the borrowers may require further drawdowns after closing, impacting the LTV of the securitised drawdowns. These facts create significant uncertainty in the loss severity on such products, given the possible increase in the LTV. We assumed a LTV for these lines of credits calculated on the maximum drawable amount instead of the current securitised amount.

- » **Sovereign risk:** On 26 June 2012 we lowered to A3 the Spanish country ceiling, which signifies the maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic issuer, including structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables. The lowering of the ceiling was prompted by the increased risk of severe financial and economic dislocation implied by the weakening of the Spanish government's creditworthiness, as reflected by our downgrade of Spain's government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on 13 June 2012.

Benchmark Analysis


Performance Relative to Sector: Exhibit 9 shows the outstanding proportion of cumulative delinquencies in our rated Spanish SME transactions grouped by originator. Please note that performance shown is affected by several factors, such as the age of the transaction, the pool specifics characteristics, the presence of a revolving period, etc.

Transaction structure diagram, if relevant

EXHIBIT 9

Spanish SME 90+ Cumulative delinquencies

(by Originator)



Source: Moody's Investors Service, periodic investor reports

Benchmark Table

Deal Name	FONCAIXA PYMES 4, FTA	Foncaixa Autonomos 1, FTA	Foncaixa Empresas 3, FTA	Foncaixa Empresas 2	Foncaixa Andaluca Ftempresas 1,FTA
Country	Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain
Closing Date	November 2013	July 2011	March 2011	November 2010	Mach 2010
Currency of Rated Issuance	Euro	Euro	Euro	Euro	Euro
Rated Notes Volume (excluding NR and Equity)	645,000,000	1,130,000,000	1,400,000,000	1,850,000,000	500,000,000
Originator	Caixabank	Caixabank	Caixabank*	Caixabank*	Caixabank*
Long-Term Rating1	Baa3 (Negative outlook)	Aa2 (Negative outlook)	Aa2 (Negative outlook)	Aa2	Aa2
Short-Term Rating1	P-3	P-1	P-1	P-1	P-1
Servicer1	Caixabank	Caixabank	Caixabank*	Caixabank*	Caixabank*
Long-Term Rating1	Baa3 (Negative outlook)	Aa2 (Negative outlook)	Aa2 (Negative outlook)	Aa2	Aa2
Short-Term Rating1	P-3	P-1	P-1	P-1	P-1
Contract Information (as % Total Pool)					
(Fully) Amortising Contracts %	85.4%	99.05%	90.87%	92.0%	97.50%
Bullet / Balloon Contracts %	14.6%	0.95%	9.13%	8.0%	2.50%
Method of Payment - Direct Debit (minimum payment)	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%		100.00%
Floating-Rate Contracts %	80.3%	90.23%	89.62%		89.00%
Fixed-Rate Contracts %	19.7%	9.77%	10.38%		11.00%
WA Initial Yield (Total Pool)	3.6%	3.44%	3.13%	2.60%	3.95%
WAL of Total Pool (in years)	4.2	8.25	5.81	5.3	7.4
WA Seasoning (in years)	2.9	3.33	1.95	1.8	2.1
WA Remaining Term (in years)	7.1	13.70	10.41	8.9	12.9
Portfolio Share in Arrears > 30 days %					
No. of Contracts	11,423	31,322	12,641	9,198	6,418
Obligor Information (as % Total Pool)					
No. of Obligors	10,625 (incl. groups)	24,372	9,653	5,580	5,838
Name: 1st Largest Industry	Beverage, Food & Tobacco	Beverage, Food & Tobacco	Construction & Building	Construction & Building	Construction & Building
2nd Largest Industry	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure	Beverage, Food & Tobacco	Beverage, Food & Tobacco
3rd Largest Industry	Construction & Building	Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals	Beverage, Food & Tobacco	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure	Hotel, Gaming & Leisure
Size %: 1st Largest Industry	21.7%	21.77%	32.88%	24.70%	30.00%
2nd Largest Industry	16.7%	16.04%	16.23%	15.70%	23.30%
3rd Largest Industry	16.4%	9.68%	14.43%	12.40%	11.10%
Effective Number (Obligor Group Level)	347	4,474	299	132	954
Single Obligor (Group) Concentration %	2.8%	0.53%	2.14%	5.40%	1.19%
Top 10 Obligor (Group) Concentration %	13.1%	3.23%	15.00%	20.8%	6.03%
Small Companies (including self employed)%	40.5%	100.00%	29.85%	32.00%	90.2%
Medium %	59.5%	0.00%	48.10%	20.00%	9.8%
Corporate %	0.00%	0.00%	22.05%	48%	0%
Collateral Information (as % Total Pool)					
WA RE Collateralisation Level	33.6%	70.25%	54.4%	50.6%	65.84%
Geographical Stratification (as % Total Pool)					
Name: 1st largest region	Catalonia	Madrid	Madrid	Madrid	Andaluca
2nd largest region	Madrid	Catalonia	Catalonia	Catalonia	
Size %:1st largest region	32.0%	15.97%	26.32%	29%	100.00%
2nd largest region	13.8%	15.22%	23.14%	28%	
Asset Assumptions					
Gross Default / Net Loss Definition in this Deal	12 months	12 months	12 months	12 month	12 months
Type of Default / Loss Distribution	Inverse Normal	Monte Carlo	Monte Carlo	Monte Carlo	Inverse normal
Mean Gross Default Rate - Initial Pool	12.4%	16.88%	14.31%	11.60%	20.00%
Stdev.	8.9%	6.37%	6.68%		9.20%
CoV	71.7%	37.71%	46.44%	55.00%	46.00%
Stochastic Recoveries Modelled	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Recovery Rate	50.00%	60.00%	57.00%	55.00%	60.00%
Stdev. Recovery Rate (if any)	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%

Deal Name	FONCAIXA PYMES 4, FTA	Foncaixa Autonomos 1, FTA	Foncaixa Empresas 3, FTA	Foncaixa Empresas 2	Foncaixa Andaluca Ftempresas 1,FTA
Correlation Severity / Default	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%
Correlation Severity	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%
Prepayment Rate(s)	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%
Fees	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%
Capital Structure (as % Total Pool) **					
Size of:					
Aaa-rated class		85.00%	80.00%	90.00%	82.00%
Aa-rated class					5.00%
A-rated class	80.00%			10.00%	13.00%
Baa-rated class		15.00%	20.00%		
Ba-rated class					
B-rated class	20.00%				
Caa and below					
rated class					
NR					
Equity					
Reserve Fund	10.00%	14.30%	10.55%	13.75%	18.00%
Senior tranche CE	30.00%	29.30%	30.55%	23.75%	36.00%

* These transactions were originated by La Caixa. Please see press release "Moody's takes rating actions on La Caixa and Caixabank (former Criteria) following transfer of banking activities" dated 1 July 2011.

** At closing

Parameter Sensitivities

Parameter sensitivities provide a quantitative, model-indicated calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might differ as certain key parameters vary.

Parameter sensitivities for this transaction were calculated in the following manner: we assumed nine scenarios derived from the combination of mean default rate: 12.4% (base case), 14.3% (base +1.9%) and 16.1% (base +3.7%) and recovery rate: 50% (base case), 45% (base -5%) and 40% (base -10%). The 12.4% default and 50% recovery rate scenario represents the base case assumptions used in the initial rating process.

The exhibits below show the parameter sensitivities for this transaction with respect to all Moody's-rated tranches*.

		Recovery Rate		
Portfolio WA PD Assumption		50.0%	45.0%	40.0%
Series A	12.4%	A3(sf)* (0)	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa1(sf) (1)
	14.3%	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa1(sf) (1)	Baa2(sf) (2)
	16.1%	Baa2(sf) (2)	Baa2(sf) (2)	Baa3(sf) (3)
Series B	12.4%	B1(sf)* (0)	B1(sf) (0)	B2(sf) (1)
	14.3%	B2(sf) (1)	B2(sf) (1)	B3(sf) (2)
	16.1%	B3(sf) (2)	B3(sf) (2)	Caa1(sf) (3)

* Results under base case assumptions indicated by asterisk '*'.

Change in model-indicated rating (number of notches) is noted in parentheses.

Results are model-indicated ratings, which are one of the many inputs considered by rating committees, which take quantitative and qualitative factors into account in determining actual ratings. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. The model does not intend to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.

Worst-case Scenarios: When the rating was assigned, the model output indicated that the Series A notes would have achieved a Baa3 model output if the cumulative mean DP was as high as 16.1% and even assuming a recovery rate as low as 40%.

Monitoring

We will monitor the transaction on an ongoing basis to ensure that it continues to perform in the manner expected, including checking all supporting ratings and reviewing periodic servicing reports. Any subsequent changes in the rating will be publicly announced and disseminated through our client service desk.

Originator Linkage: CaixaBank will act as servicer, issuer account bank and paying agent.

Significant Influences: In addition to the counterparty issues noted, the following factors may have a significant impact on this transaction's ratings: further deterioration in the real estate market causing longer recovery lags and higher price declines than the stressed values which were assumed in our modelling.

Counterparty Rating Triggers	Condition	Remedies
Issuer Account Bank	Loss of Ba1	Replace/Eligible guarantor

Monitoring Report: We have reviewed the standard monitoring report (publicly available at the company website for previous similar deals) and would like to receive the following important data in addition to the information reflected on the report:

- » All the transaction's triggers details
- » The amount of gross excess spread before write offs
- » Prepaid principal amount.
- » The amount of loans restructured or refinanced.
- » Quarterly loan-by-loan pool evolution reports (including recovery data)

Representations and Warranties

The Rule 17g-7 Report of Representations and Warranties is hereby incorporated by reference and can be found at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF348656

Moody's Related Research

For a more detailed explanation of Moody's approach to this type of transaction as well as similar transactions please refer to the following reports:

Rating Methodology:

- » [Moody's Approach to Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations, May 2013 \(SF294868\)](#)

Rating Implementation Guidance:

- » [The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines, March 2013 \(SF316982\)](#)

Special Reports:

- » [Spanish SME Performance Indices, June, 2013 \(SF340228\)](#)
- » [Structural Features in the Spanish RMBS Market – Artificial Write-Off Mechanisms: Trapping the Spread, January 2004 \(SF29881\)](#)

Credit Opinion:

- » [Caixabank](#)

To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.

Appendix 1: Originator's Underwriting and Collection Practices

Originator Ability:	<p>Caixabank is Spain's third-largest banking group and second-largest player in the domestic market closely behind BBVA. Although Caixabank has a nationwide franchise, the group is particularly strong in the economically stronger Catalonia and Navarra regions, where it holds market shares (by business volumes) of 32.3% and 37.6%, respectively. Catalonia is one of Spain's wealthiest regions and has a diversified economy. Nationwide, Caixabank has a 13.03% share of deposits and 13.64% of loans as of end-December 2012. CaixaBank is Spain's market leader in bancassurance, the leading issuer of credit cards both in terms of turnover and number of cards in circulation, and has a national market share of 14% in mutual funds.</p> <p>In addition, the group has built an international presence outside of Spain. To this extent, the bank has stakes in Grupo Financiero Inbursa, Banco BPI, Boursorama, Erste Group Bank and the Bank of East Asia.</p>
Sales and Marketing Practices:	<p>Caixabank provides services to its customers through a multi-channel distribution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Branch network in Spain: 5,920 branches (as of September 2013). » Employees: 32,347 (as of September 2013). » 80 specialised branches for companies with more than €10 million turnover, and two purely for large corporate (turnover above €200 million). » 33 specialised branches for private banking (as of September 2013). » 15 international branches (as of September 2013).
Underwriting Policies and Procedures:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank's analytical approach is primarily based on the borrower's repayment capacity rather than the nature of the securities pledged. » Internal rating and credit scoring: The several internal rating and credit scoring systems in place play a key role in Caixabank's underwriting process. The entity has several different models, among these: three for SMEs depending on the obligor's size, one for real estate developers and one for large corporates. The scoring system for self-employed individuals is a very efficient tool, with scores updated monthly. The same efficiency is detected in the internal rating system for corporates, where the internal ratings are updated annually (when the financial statements are published) but also operational alerts are periodically shown. For SMEs, ratings are updated on a monthly basis. Both systems have already been certified by the Bank of Spain (so the size of regulatory capital needed is estimated with them). » Approval mechanisms to cover specific segments, distinguishing between retail banking, property development and corporate banking. » System of authorisation limits based on expected loss. » Electronic file as a procedure for managing applications. » Individual customer segment: risk-adjusted price control systems for mortgage applications through differentiated authorisation limits. » Business segment: Risk metrics in the approval process: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ratings: essential element in the analysis. Controls are set up to ensure that the ratings are used in analysing the risk of each loan. If the rating has not been updated the system rejects the operation. - System of risk adjusted prices. This complements the assessment of risk adjusted return at customer level, calculated monthly as benchmark spread (risk cost) versus margin on risk (customer level margin). » Employees have authority to grant small loans to borrowers with high exposure, therefore streamlining processes. » 71.5% of approved loans granted at branch level, 13.4% granted by the area managers, 10.7% by the business division managers and 4.4% by the head office and the Board of Directors (as of December 2013).
Collateral Valuation Policies and Procedures:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank has set up a validation and benchmarking process to ensure the adequate valuation of the collateral assets. » Based on independent valuations from appraisal firms registered with Bank of Spain. Different levels and committees to authorise the operations.
Closing Policies and Procedures:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » In line with the market standards.
Credit Risk Management:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » The Board of Directors determines the group's risk policies and delegates the creation of risk management committees. » Global Risk Committee: In charge of a comprehensive management of the Group's risks, among them credit risk. It establishes a series of triggers whose breach prompts, depending on the type of risk, different alerts, communications, and courses of action at different levels of the organisation. » Credit Committee: Analyses and, if appropriate, approves operations within its level of responsibility, referring those outside the bounds of its authority to the Board of Directors. In addition, there are specialised committees including: a committee for deciding on loan refinancing, a committee on property valuations and a committee on risk monitoring. » Risk measurement models: Tools and techniques based on specific needs of each type of risk, including ratings, scorings, probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). The models are integrated into management and monitoring. » Banking Business Management Model implemented throughout the organisation down to the branch level. » The branches have innovative tools on hand to assist them with global management of all the business they generate. » The internal models for measuring credit risk have received approval from the Bank of Spain.
Originator Stability:	Baa3/P-3/D+, negative outlook
Quality Controls and Audits:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank is regulated by the Bank of Spain and carries out annual external audits. » Internal Audit Division: continuously monitors internal control systems and checks the accuracy of the risk measurement and control methods employed by the various divisions involved in risk monitoring.
Regulated by:	» Bank of Spain
Management Strength and Staff Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Average tenure with company: Not made available. » Average Turnover of underwriting staff: Not made available. » Length of tenor for head of credit risk management: Not made available. » Compensation structure i.e., incentive for receivables growth: Not made available.

Arrears Management:

# of Receivables per Collector:	» Not made available.
Staff Description:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank has a staff of around 340 supervising the recovery process, which is carried out at different levels of the organisation, starting at the branch level. The document preparation tasks (before the judicial process) are outsourced to GDS-CUSA, a company fully owned by Caixabank . » Average tenure with company: Not made available. » Turnover: Not made available. » Compensation structure i.e., incentive for collections achieved: Not made available.
Early Stage Arrears Practices:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Caixabank checks daily the debtors' accounts in case of unpaid positions in order to collect any amount in such accounts. » Early stage arrears includes communication with the borrower through different channels (telephone calls, letters).
Late Stage Arrears Practices:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Pre-litigation process (where legal file for litigation is prepared) can generally begin after 45 days in arrears. For loans backed by a mortgage pre-litigation starts at day 61. For unsecured loans legal proceedings starts at around day 110. In cases where legal procedures have weaker chances (overdrafts, credit cards) the "friendly" recovery phase is exhausted, and legal proceedings starts at around day 200. » Caixabank works with a group of external lawyers for litigation matters. » Caixabank can repossess properties in case of void auctions. » Even after default (formal write-off) of the loan, branches remain responsible of further recovery actions, with the help of external specialised companies.
Average Time to Repossess:	» Not made available.
Loan Modifications:	» Not made available.

» contacts continued from page 1

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